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Editorial
For this month’s issue of The
Reasoner, I’m happy to inter-
view Neil Sinhababu. Neil
is associate professor of Phi-
losophy at the National Uni-
versity of Singapore. His re-
search focuses on questions
in moral philosophy, like
e.g., the question whether
and if so, how we can know
about objective moral truth,
and a number of his works are inspired by Nietzsche and Hume.
I met Neil at the Centre for the Study of Social Action (CSSA)
at the University of Milan in Italy in May 2017 where he gave
a seminar talk on experientialism about moral concepts. We
had great scientific discussions afterwards on his recent book
‘Humean Nature’ afterwards and I organized a book sympo-
sium for Neil in July 2017 at CSSA to continue these dis-
cussions. The interview with Neil aims at giving the readers
of The Reasoner an overview of some of his main arguments
spelled out in ‘Humean Nature’. I’ll be happy to meet Neil
again in March 2018 to give a seminar talk at the National Uni-
versity of Singapore after a 1-month visiting research stay at
the Macquarie University Research Centre for Agency, Values,
and Ethics (CAVE).
Anika Fiebich
Centre for the Study of Social Action, University of Milan
Features
Interview with Neil Sinhababu
Anika Fiebich: Neil, how did you get into research?
Neil Sinhababu: My research concerns whether there is ob-
jective moral truth, and if so, how we can know it. This ques-
tion seemed awesome to me from my first year in college. I
moved out of the sciences and into philosophy to explore it.
AF: Ah, so what did you do before doing philosophy?
NS: I thought I’d go into some part of the sciences – perhaps
biology, which I’d been good at in high school. My father was
an organic chemist who worked in the pharmaceutical industry,
and I expected to do something similar. But I took a class on
Nietzsche at the same time that I took second-semester organic
chemistry, and I couldn’t focus on my chemistry homework be-
cause I was thinking about philosophy all the time. I switched
over to philosophy after that and I’ve been thinking about it
ever since.
AF: What are your general research interests?
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NS: Answering this question requires exploring a very broad
range of issues about knowledge, facts, and human psychol-
ogy, as well as specifically moral topics. Metaethics is the area
where all these things come together, and it’s my main area of
research. Some of my research concerns the nonmoral ques-
tions in these areas by themselves, but I usually get interested
in them by seeing their relations to the moral questions.
AF: What was your motivation to write Humean Nature?
NS: I wrote Humean Nature because I thought the search
for objective moral facts was being led astray by incorrect psy-
chological theories, and I wanted to set things right. Many
philosophers agree with Immanuel Kant and other rationalists
that moral judgments are beliefs about objective reasons for ac-
tion, which can motivate us without any assistance from a pre-
existing desire. I think David Hume is right that the thoughts
and feelings accompanying both moral and nonmoral moti-
vation are evidence of pre-existing desires driving us in both
cases. Our theories of moral judgment need to recognize this.
Combining rationalist views of moral judgment with a Humean
view of human psychology gives the result that humans are psy-
chologically incapable of making moral judgments! So, if the
Humean view is empirically well-supported, we have to get rid
of the rationalist view of moral judgment.
Some of the ideas in the book have interested psychologists
who aren’t especially concerned with the moral questions. If
the book ends up being useful to them, that’ll be wonderful! I
tried to write it in an accessible style so that readers from psy-
chology and other areas wouldn’t be confused by unexplained
philosophical terminology.
AF: In Humean Nature you describe how desire drives our
actions, thoughts and feelings as well as how passion explains
motivation and reasoning. Here you follow David Hume. In
which respect does your account draw on Hume and in which
respect does it differ?
NS: I’m presenting an updated version of Hume’s view that
desire – or as he called it, passion – drives everything we do.
Some of his ideas about how vivid representations of a pas-
sion’s object increase the passion’s intensity are helpful im-
provements upon today’s theories, and I’ve used those in the
book. On other issues, psychology has moved past Hume, but
his basic ideas can be helpful even we understand things like
desire’s relation to pleasure in a more modern way.
One big point of disagreement between us concerns whether
morality is about objective facts. I think so and he’d disagree.
But I’ve tried to develop an account of moral judgment that
treats moral judgments as beliefs about objective facts, while
fitting nicely within his psychological picture.
AF: In your book you discuss how the properties of desire
can explain various psychological phenomena, including inten-
tion, willpower, daydreaming and selfhood. How can the prop-
erties of desire explain intention, for example?
NS: One big issue concerns how desire can explain the role
of intentions in our plans for the future. As Michael Brat-
man noted, intending to do something goes along with plan-
ning ways to do it, and planning for how to deal with the con-
sequences. Bratman didn’t think desire could explain this, so
he advanced a view of intention that didn’t treat it as a kind of
desire.
AF: I remember that your chapter on desire starts with a letter
to Michael Bratman, doesn’t it?
NS: Yes, that is right. I respond to Bratman by noting the
role of desire in directing our attention. If you’re hungry, you’ll
pay attention to food, looking at food if it’s nearby and thinking
about what you’d like to eat even if it isn’t nearby. This is why
hunger can get you start thinking about where to eat. If there’s
a restaurant with tasty food nearby, but your friend recently got
food poisoning there, your desire to not get sick will direct your
attention to that fact as well, and you’ll have some motivation
not to go there. I tell Bratman that the role of desire in directing
attention makes it useful for explaining how we plan.
AF: What are the implica-
tions of the resulting psycho-
logical picture that you draw
for theories of moral judge-
ments?
NS: The book presents
a big psychological argu-
ment against views on which
moral judgment is a belief
that can motivate action by
itself. These views have
turned meta-ethics into a search for objective reasons for action.
I see this as a big mistake, driven partly by confusion about the
role that beliefs about such reasons might play in human psy-
chology. When philosophers don’t find objective reasons of the
right kind, they may conclude that moral judgment is always
mistaken or that these reasons exist as non-natural additions to
the natural world that we can intuitively grasp.
AF: Do you think that moral judgments are about objective
reasons for action at all?
NS: No. I argue that moral judgments are about when feel-
ings like guilt, horror, and admiration accurately represent ob-
jective reality. Most of my arguments come from the role
that recent experiments suggest moral feeling plays in caus-
ing moral judgment, which seem surprisingly similar to the
causal role that color experience plays in causing color belief.
This causal role enables color experience to give you a grasp
of color concepts – you wouldn’t fully master the concept of
yellow if you didn’t know what the experience of yellow was
like. And you wouldn’t fully master the concept of wrongness
if you didn’t know what guilt was like.
AF: You say that when we feel guilty about our action, it
feels like we’ve done something wrong. If our feeling is accu-
rate, we did something wrong. But what about the case when
our feeling is inaccurate, like an illusion, if we didn’t do any-
thing wrong?
NS: It’s not that discovering the accuracy-conditions of
moral belief will be easy – there are a lot of ways you could
go where it seems to get you into the same old problems! But
I’m convinced that it’s more tractable, because it gets you away
from reasons and into the philosophy of perception, where new
theoretical options are available. I plan to explain how this all
works in the book after Humean Nature.
Stanley and the Stakes Hypothesis
Jason Stanley (2005: Knowledge and Practical Interests, Ox-
ford University Press) has argued for pragmatic encroachment
(PE). PE is the view that knowledge depends intrinsically on
practical factors. The view is motivated by cases where it is
supposed that what an agent is doing has significance with re-
spect to what they know. Allegdedly, by examining pairs of
cases that differ only in terms of the stakes involved, we can see
that such variation in stakes results in knowledge being present
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or absent. Consider these cases:
HANNAH AND SARAH 1: Hannah and her wife
Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They
plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit
their paychecks. It is not important that they do so, as
they have no impending bills. But as they drive past
the bank, they notice that the lines inside are very
long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Real-
izing that it isn’t very important that they paychecks
are deposited right away, Hannah says, ‘I know the
bank will be open tomorrow, since I was there just
two weeks ago on Saturday morning. So we can de-
posit our paychecks tomorrow morning (2005, 3-4).’
HANNAH AND SARAH 2: Hannah and her wife
Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They
plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit
their paychecks. Since they have an impending bill
coming due, and very little in their account, it is very
important that they deposit their paychecks by Sat-
urday. Hannah notes that she was at the bank two
week before on a Saturday morning, and it was open.
But, as Sarah points out, banks do change their hours.
Hannah says, ‘I guess you’re right. I do not know that
the bank will be open tomorrow (2005, 4).’
Hannah supposedly knows that the bank will be open tomorrow
in the first case, but not in thesecond, because of the difference
in the practical interests (Stanley (2005) and Hawthorne and
Stanley (2008: Knowledge and Action, The Journal of Philos-
ophy 105, 571-590)). More generally, in low stakes situations
knowledge is taken to be more prevalent than in higher stakes
situations. Let us call this idea the low/high stakes hypothesis:
(LHSH) Lower stakes correlate with knowledge and
higher stakes correlate lack of knowledge.
Whatever one says about PE itself, there are cases that show
that LHSH is implausible. In other words, there are epistemi-
cally identical cases where it is plausible to claim that knowl-
edge correlates with high stakes not low stakes. Consider these
cases:
LOUISA 1: Louisa has leukemia and has been
through the standard protocol of chemotherapy. She
subsequently relapsed. Her doctors offer her an ex-
perimental treatment with some minor known side-
effects and for which they have only some modestly
positive anecdotal information regarding efficacy. If
she does nothing she will die very soon. She says ‘I
know that the treatment will work, so I should take
it.’
LOUISA 2: Louisa has leukemia and has been
through the standard protocol of chemotherapy. The
treatment has been successful and she shows no sign
of relapse. Her doctors offer her an experimental
treatment with some minor side-effects and for which
they only have some modestly positive anecdotal in-
formation regarding efficacy. If she does nothing she
will continue as is with some risk of relapse. She
says ‘I do not know that the treatment will work, so I
should not take it.’
LOUISA 1 is a higher
stakes case than LOUISA
2. But, it seems reason-
able to say that Louisa has
knowledge in LOUISA 1 but
not in LOUISA 2 contra
LHSH. This is precisely be-
cause the stakes are so high
in LOUISA 1 that to be ratio-
nal she must act by taking the
experimental treatment. She
knows then according to the
knowledge norm of practical reason (KN-PR):
(KN-PR) One should act on a proposition, if and only
if, it is known.
Stanley (2005: 9-10)
But, it would be irrational for her to take the treatment in
LOUISA 2. Thus, she knows in LOUISA 1 even though she
does not know in LOUISA 2 and the stakes are higher in the
first case.
This is not entirely surprising. In decision situations where
probabilities cannot be meaningfully assigned to outcomes
(other than that they are non-zero) advice about what to do is
wholly a function of utilities because no expected utilities can
be calculated therein. In such cases where the potential loses
are great the maximin rule is applies:
(MR) maximize the minimum utility outcome.
Resnik (1987: Choices, University of Minneapolis
Press, 26-27)
Where T is ‘take the treatment’, E is ‘the treatment is effica-
cious’, D is ‘dies’, I is ‘condition improves’, F is ‘is effected
by minor side-effectsr and S is ‘condition stays the same’ we




Assume the following relative ordering of utilities: V(I) >
V(I&F) > V(S ) > V(S&F) > V(F) > V(D). MR tells us to
look at the worst outcomes of the acts given the relevant states
of the world. For ¬T we get both (¬T&E) and (T&¬E) and for
T we get (T&¬E). But these values are equal. By the lexical
MR we then look at the next lowest outcome(s) of ¬T and T . In
the case of T we get (T&E) and there is no better outcome for
¬T . So, the MR tells us that it is maximally rational for Louisa




Applying MR we see that we have a maximal min-
ima for ¬T at (¬T&E) and (T&¬E) and this is
the case for T as well. So, according to the MR
to be maximally rational Louisa should do ¬T .
Michael Shaffer
St. Cloud State University
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The Reasoner Speculates
Leaky abstractions in the foundations of decision
theory
There are two main approaches to basic framework for deci-
sion theory in philosophy. Savage’s framework takes there to
be three kinds of things: acts, states and outcomes. States are
the things that determine how successful your actions are, out-
comes are the things you are trying to bring about or avoid by
acting.
Acts are thought of as
functions from states to out-
comes: an act brings about a
particular outcome in a par-
ticular state of the world.
We might say that outcomes
are the objects of desire, the
states are the objects of belief
and the acts are objects of
choice. An alternative view
– that espoused by Richard
Jeffrey – is to take everything
to be a proposition. Some
propositions are distinguished by the fact that you have it in
your power to make them true or false at will: these will be
the acts. Acts will in fact be conjunctions of dependency hy-
potheses of some sort: “if the state is x, then a will eventuate;
if the state is y then b will eventuate...” Whether something
is a state or an outcome depends not on what sort of thing it
is, but on what sort of influence it has on the structure of your
preferences. How do these frameworks relate?
Well, here’s an analogy. Think about an integrated circuit.
Everything is just a number: the machine code instructions, the
data, the addresses of the data... Or not even: everything is just
a particular configuration of particular parts of physical com-
puter memory. Certain configurations of high/low current are
understood as representing certain binary digits 1 or 0 which
are interpreted as numbers. But, what makes things work is
the way the number is treated: that’s what makes something
a machine code, or an address or what have you. A number in
memory is treated as an instruction if, when it is read, it leads to
particular transistors to turn particular circuits on or off. What
makes some number a piece of data is if it is used to decide
whether to send a high or a low signal through those circuits
controlled by the instruction. What makes a number a mem-
ory address is if the instruction that preceded it is the sort of
instruction that takes an address as an argument. (Charles Pet-
zold does an excellent job of explaining computer architecture
in his book “Code”: a book I would recommend to anybody
who spends a significant amount of their time on a computer.)
In the same way, despite acts, outcomes and states all being
the same sort of things on Jeffrey’s view, they are dealt with
differently. Indeed, one might think of Savage’s approach as
formalising the separation that is implicit in the attitudes we
have to the various kinds of Jeffrey propositions. To stretch the
analogy further, higher level computer programming languages
will abstract away from the machine code. This involves dis-
tinguishing different kinds of entities (often called types). So
despite the fact that everything is fundamentally a number,
some kinds of symbols will be used to refer to instructions,
some other method will be used for referencing addresses, and
some other way to indicate an actual number. Higher level
programming languages will have different kinds of objects:
strings, floating point numbers, signed integers, unsigned in-
tegers, lists... These are all, at base, numbers in memory, but
it’s useful to have different shortcut methods for manipulating
them, since they need to be treated differently. If two num-
bers are representing particular strings of letters, then it doesn’t
make sense to add them together. You can do it, but the re-
sult doesn’t have any meaningful interpretation. (Annoyingly,
the “+” operator is often overloaded to do string concatenation,
instead of adding the underlying numbers together...)
I think the same sort of thing is going on in the relationship
between the decision theory frameworks. Everything can be
thought of, at base, as a proposition. But some kinds of propo-
sitions we want to think of as events, and their logical structure
and interrelationships are important. For other propositions –
e.g. the acts – it is the preference structure over them which is
important to us.
Often, the abstraction of treating different kinds of proposi-
tions as different is a legitimate move: things are conceptually
simpler. Savage sets things up in this simple way. But it is
a “leaky abstraction” as all abstractions are. What this means
is that in the edge cases, in the unusual circumstances, the ab-
straction breaks down. For example, when the acts are not in-
dependent of the states, the basic Savage set up will go haywire
(and we need to shift to something like causal decision the-
ory). And when this happens, all sorts of strange behaviour can
emerge. So we can think of Savage’s tripartite distinction as an
abstraction of Jeffrey’s single-type system. I think this is an il-
luminating way of thinking about the relationship between the
two camps.
Seamus Bradley
Philosophy, University of Tilburg
News
International Network for Economic Methodol-
ogy, 28–30 August
At the end of August, philosophers and social scientists con-
vened in San Sebastia´n for the biannual International Network
for Economic Methodology (INEM) conference. The confer-
ence was hosted at Palacio Miramar from the 28th till the 30th
of August. The event provided attendants with an opportunity
to discuss and reflect upon past, current and future develop-
ments in economics.
Preceding the conference,
the Philosophy of Eco-
nomics working group of
the Young Scholars Initiative
(Institute for New Eco-
nomic Thinking) organized
a workshop for (especially)
young scholars. In the
wake of INEM, participants
discussed issues related
to capitalism, technology
and even scientism. Sonja
Amadae (MIT and TINT,
University of Helsinki) gave a keynote talk in which she
discussed how to assess the validity of (behavioral) economic
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models. When looking for instance at the financial crisis, it
seems that economic models have failed considerably. Sonja
concluded that there may be two plausible explanations. Either
our models are too narrow, and thus not able to capture all pos-
sible preferences and actions, or the models’ implementation
is faulty.
In discussing these issues, the workshop was a great build-
up to the conference. The organizing team, consisting of Nicola
Craigs (Durham University), Julian Reiss (Durham University)
and David Teira (UNED), set up a program that highlighted the
diversity, as well as the quality of the field. The eleven paral-
lel sessions were structured around themes in which—amongst
others—issues of modelling, ethics, evidence, measurement,
philosophy of science and rationality were discussed. Each ses-
sion included three paper presentations. Participants (about 70
in total) from all over the world ranged from PhD students to
established professors.
In her keynote, Diane Coyle (University of Manch-
ester/BBC/Enlightenment Economics) discussed issues similar
to those addressed by Sonja Amadae, on economic decision-
making and economic models, but from a different perspective.
According to Diane, it is especially welfare theories that war-
rant our attention as they fail to account for current develop-
ments in society.
Diane argued that the economy is becoming more complex
as a consequence of, for example, technological change. These
changes pose new questions—related to the market power of
online markets and digital networks, social media, the growth
of cities etc.,—that both academics and policy makers need to
answer. Diane pointed out, however, that the welfare theories
that should provide these answers are unable to do so. It is
therefore not the rational agent assumption that poses the main
challenge
To conclude, many new and innovative ideas on economics
and philosophy have circulated during the three days of INEM.
The nice atmosphere and the interdisciplinary environment in-
vited for thought-provoking talks and discussions. I can say
that I could not be happier to have had my first conference in
San Sebastia´n. I am looking forward to seeing you again in two
years!
Juliette R. de Wit
University of Groningen
European Philosophy of Science Association,6–9
September
The Sixth Edition of the
European Philosophy of
Science Association (EPSA)
Conference took place in
Exeter, UK, from 6 to 9
September. The event is
probably the largest biennial
conference in the field of
philosophy of science in
Europe, this year hosting
more than 300 participants
from all over the world. The
organization of such a big
event was made possible
thanks to the joint efforts of the EPSA programme committee,
co-chaired by Thomas Reydon and David Teira, and of the
local committee consisting of Adam Toon, Sabina Leonelli,
John Dupre´, Shane Glackin, Staffan Muller-Wille and Chee
Wong, from the Exeter Centre for the Study of the Life
Sciences.
The conference venue was the beautiful Streatham Campus
of the University of Exeter: a magnificent botanic garden, sur-
rounded by lakes, parkland, and woodlands, with exotic trees
and art sculptures amid modern university buildings.
In his opening speech, the outgoing EPSA President Stephan
Hartmann gave us an overview of the current state of the As-
sociation and of the conference ahead. In addition to the three
keynote speakers—Sonja Amadae, Philip Kitcher and Margaret
Morrison—the programme featured some 120 contributed pa-
pers, 14 symposia and 26 posters. The conference was designed
to showcase the state of the art in philosophy of science and to
connect scholars, aiming to create an independent community
of philosophers of science in Europe.
Several satellite events were scheduled between the regu-
lar sessions. The Women’s Caucus organized both an infor-
mal breakfast and an evening lecture, where Helen Beebee dis-
cussed the problem of the under-representation of women in
philosophy of science and what we could do to improve it. A
special lunch session discussed how to write ERC grants, and
in yet another session the two new editors of EJPS, Phyllis Il-
lari and Federica Russo, presented their vision for the journal
for the coming years.
Going back to the keynotes, in her lecture, Margaret Mor-
rison renewed a central debate in philosophy of science about
experiments and simulations. By looking at the research con-
ducted with the Large Hadron Collider by physicists working at
CERN, she challenged the dichotomy between simulations and
experiments that is often referred to in the literature. As clearly
emerges from the work at CERN, an enormous amount of re-
sults from simulated data was crucial to the discovery of the
Higgs boson. Experiments and simulations turn out to be so in-
tertwined, that it becomes questionable to talk about knowledge
from data without knowledge from simulations. This opens up
an important set of methodological questions for those philoso-
phers of science who are interested in scientific practice.
Sonja Amadae engaged the audience with a very interesting
lecture on agency theory and how group action supervenes on
individuals’ actions. While the usual focus of agency theory is
on corporate actors comprised of human members, Sonja con-
sidered hybrid actors encompassing human agents and artifi-
cially intelligent networks. She reflected on how they integrate
information and on the normative questions that arise from this
process.
Finally, Philip Kitcher’s plenary talk offered a historical
overview of the last century in philosophy of science, focusing
on the kind of audience that philosophers of science have ad-
dressed over time. As Kitcher’s talk enables us to reflect on the
current state of philosophy of science, as it also emerges from
the EPSA, let me spend a few more words on his argument.
Kitcher?s overview started from the logical positivists and
their manifesto for a “scientific philosophy”, whose focus then
shifted to the problems of confirmation, the laws of nature, the
function of models and scientific realism. Kitcher went through
several other crucial steps in the philosophy of science, rang-
ing from Feyerabend and Kuhn to the Stanford School and the
work on the metaphysics of causation. Within this overview,
he identified as a particularly significant turning point, the lec-
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ture to the Philosophy of Science Association, delivered thirty
years ago by its then President Arthur Fine. In that lecture, Fine
declared that the philosophy of science was dead, and that its
legitimate successor was the philosophy of the special sciences.
Kitcher invited us to challenge this view. In his view, there
is more to philosophy than being scientifically informed and
there is more to philosophers’ work than expertise in the special
sciences. Kitcher’s worry is that the role of values in science
has been gradually removed from the discipline, and he is con-
cerned that the topic should be brought back into the picture,
also as a way to connect with the general public.
Now, given that EPSA offers a portrait of current philosophy
of science, we can ask ourselves: how does Kitcher’s view re-
flect the state of the art? How influential was the lecture that
Fine gave thirty years ago? And how much attention do we pay
to the role of values as compared to the special sciences and to
general philosophy of science?
A quick look at the distribution of the talks per topic can help
us to address these questions. Out of a total of 120 talks, 14
symposia and 13 posters, there were 47 talks in general philos-
ophy of science, including formal philosophy of science (plus 6
symposia and 5 posters). The philosophy of the special sciences
had 112 talks, 8 symposia and 7 posters. Talks that address the
problem of values or of non-epistemic factors in science num-
bered 7 plus one poster. For the distribution within the special
sciences, see the graph below.
This is just a rough sum-
mary that leaves several is-
sues aside, such as how best
to classify talks; however,
at least at first glance, the
overview squares quite well
with Kitcher’s picture. Taken
together, the philosophies of
the special sciences largely outnumber general philosophy of
science (55% to 31%). A move towards values appears to be
still in its infancy, but an interesting comparison will perhaps al-
ready be possible at the next EPSA. If Kitcher’s programmatic
talk made history, we can expect an increase in contributions
on the topic of values in science in the future.
Speaking of which, EPSA 2019 will be hosted by the Uni-
versity of Geneva, headed by Marcel Weber. The new pres-
ident of EPSA is Samir Okasha, who takes over the position
that Stephan Hartmann has held for the past four years. While
thanking Stephan and his group for the great work they did for
EPSA in the past four years, let us wish the best of luck to
Samir Okasha for the years to come. Geneva, remember, is just
next door to CERN. This gives us a great opportunity to orga-
nize an excursion, perhaps with the help of some of the many
the philosophers of physics in our association. The other 80%




Scientific Discovery and Inferences: special issue of Topoi,
deadline 15 October.
Disagreement: Perspectives from Argumentation Theory and
Epistemology: special issue of Topoi, deadline 31 October.
Formal Models of Scientific Inquiry: special issue of Journal
for General Philosophy of Science, deadline 1 December.
New Directions in the Epistemology of Modality: special is-
sue of Synthese, deadline 31 December.
Dissemination Corner
The Logic of Conceivability
Imagination in Rome Last time, Franz introduced the project
the Logic of Conceivability and discussed some of the logical
issues we aim to address. This time, I will say more about
a philosophical issue that we engage with: Modal Epistemol-
ogy. Modal Epistemology concerns issues about how we can
know what is possible and necessary. For example, consider
the couch that you want to move and you wonder whether there
is a way to get the couch through the door. That is, you won-
der whether it is possible that the couch fits through the door.
This is a very mundane, everyday situation and modal epis-
temology aims to explain how we acquire (or fail to acquire)
such knowledge. Obviously, there are also less mundane ques-
tions of this sort such as whether it is possible that this table is
made out of ice, or whether it is possible whether there is trans-
parent iron. (Peter has an interesting paper on the distinction
between mundane and ‘exotic’ possibilities, following work by
Peter van Inwagen.)
Now, as you remember, in work by Franz on the logic of
imagination (e.g., here); imagination is allowed to ‘reach the
impossible’. That is, in certain, restricted cases, we can imag-
ine the impossible. However, one of the oldest accounts of how
we acquire knowledge of possibility (and necessity) is through
the use of imagination (this goes, at least, back to Hume and
Descartes). But, if we can imagine the impossible, how can
imagination then be a good guide to what is possible and nec-
essary? We will not solve the issue here, but let me make some
remarks about it. First of all, note that it is (still) very contro-
versial to hold that we can imagine the impossible. So, we will
need to argue for this in and of itself. Secondly, if we allow
our imagination to reach the impossible, then we need to make
some remarks with regards to modal epistemology—i.e., if not
imagination, then what is a reliable guide to the possible?
There are many theories of modal epistemology that are cur-
rently discussed in the literature (e.g., Timothy Williamson’s
counterfactual analysis is one of them, as is George Bealer’s
modal intuitions account) and which one is most suitable for a
modal epistemology constitutes a large part of the philosoph-
ical side of the Logic of Conceivability project. For exam-
ple, last June the Conceivability and Modality conference at
the Sapienza Uninversity in Rome revolved around these issues
and the Logic of Conceivability project was well represented.
All of us were present and both Franz and myself had the op-
portunity to speak at the conference, alongside Albert Cassullo,
Boris Kment, Tito Magri, Antonella Mallozzi, Daniel Nolan,
Jonathan Schaffer, Anand Vaidya, and Barbara Vetter.
Franz presented new work on aboutness in imagination. That
is, the talk aimed to address the question of what we can imag-
ine, given a certain input. Franz develops a new model theo-
retic framework, using only possible worlds, where he incor-
porates the notion of ‘aboutness’. This captures the idea that
our imaginary developments (have to) remain on topic. Franz’
work on this resulted in another publication under the LoC-flag
(more on this below). My presentation concerned a more philo-
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sophical analysis of imagination and in particular how imagi-
nation can figure into a theory of modal epistemology. The aim
of my presentation was to critically evaluate a recent attempt to
build an imagination-based modal epistemology. For, as should
be clear by now, we at the Logic of Conceivability project (or
at least some of us), think that we can imagine the impossible.
More Conceiving People When Franz wrote the last entry, we
were hiring. Now that we have it is time to introduce you to
the complete Logic of Conceivability dream-team. As noted,
the principal investigator is Franz Berto, with Peter Hawke as
the first four-year postdoc, and me as the PhD candidate of the
project. In addition, we hired two more four-year postdocs
and it is my pleasure to introduce you to Aybu¨ke O¨zgu¨n and
Karolina Krzyz˙anowska.
Aybu¨ke works on Dynamic Epistemic Logics, which she
analyses using mathematical techniques from topology. She
will join us in October, right after she has defended her PhD,
which is a joint degree from the Institute for Logic, Language,
and Computation and LORIA, CNRS, Universite´ de Lorraine
under the supervision of Hans van Ditmarsch, Nick Bezhan-
ishvili, and Sonja Smets.
Karolina works in the psychology of reasoning and, in par-
ticular, the semantics and pragmatics of conditionals and how
we use these in reasoning. She finished her PhD at the Univer-
sity of Groningen under the supervision of Igor Douven, where
she worked on an analysis of conditionals from both a philo-
sophical and empirical perspective. Currently, she is a postdoc
at the LMU Munich, where she works with Stephan Hartmann
on the Scientific Reasoning and Argumentation project.
We are really happy that both Aybu¨ke and Karolina will join us.
More Conceived Outputs Since the last post, we have not
sat still and there are more articles out under our project’s
flag. First of all, Franz has published a joint paper with
Rohan French, Dave Ripley, and Graham Priest in response
to Williamson’s rejection of counterpossibles. The paper,
Williamson on Counterpossibles, evaluates and responds to all
objections given by Williamson and then they go on to propose
a simple semantics for a non-vacuous counterpossibles.
Secondly, as I mentioned above, Franz has published his pa-
per on Aboutness in Imagination. In it, he develops a modal
framework for imagination that incorporates aboutness condi-
tions in a logic for imagination, using only possible worlds.
This is different from his previous paper, where he presents a
logic of imagination with non-normal, or impossible, worlds.




What’s Hot in . . .
Medieval Reasoning
Cryptic writing is a cornerstone of a layperson’s perception
of academia; however, there’s often a bit of truth in stereo-
types. That academic writing is more often than not unnec-
essarily obscure, muddy, and pointlessly verbose isn’t merely
a layman’s misconception, but a real issue about which most
academics love to complain. Academic-ese is the stylis-
tic equivalent of showing up to a formal tea party wear-
ing white socks and sandals: it’s only comfortable for the
one doing it. While some
fields are more affected than
others, at some point al-
most all of us have attended
an utterly incomprehensible
talk or stumbled upon an
article that, while being in
our own sub-subfield, was so
sibylline that we felt like we
had to possess some kind of
paranormal divinatory skills
just to get the gist of it.
And even when a text is
comprehensible, chances are
that nonetheless it’s dread-
fully boring despite a gen-
uine interest in the topic or the soundness of its thesis. There
are also funny and witty academic papers, but they are few and
far between. Maybe academic-ese is a lot like the common
cold that one catches on the bus to work when the flu is go-
ing around: if most people around you have it, no matter how
careful you are, after a few days you are going to come home
with a runny nose. No-one is immune. Whoever is without
sin may cast the first stone... yet in academia we love casting
stones – it’s our job – even though we are an undeniably sinful
lot. But why does academic writing stink so much? That is the
question. Among others, Steven Pinker tried to answer it in an
excellent (and unusually well written) article, that you can find
here.
Pinker does an outstanding job of analysing some of the
most common and obnoxious features of the academic style,
while measuring it against the stylistic ideal for expository
prose: that is, the classic style of 17th century French essay-
ists. Academic-ese should aim for clarity and to be informa-
tive, however it often complicates things unnecessarily, using
the kind of hyper-technical jargon that’s the author’s idiolect,
indulging in excessive meta-discourse, and being overly apolo-
getic, self-referential and abstract. The assumption that the
reader knows exactly what the author knows is the academic
writer’s original sin; incidentally, were things so, writing a pa-
per would be completely pointless – and good riddance if the
paper happens to be unreadable. On the other hand the classic
style tries to keep it simple, even deceptively so: classic essay-
ists go for a plain and smooth prose, preferring the concrete to
the abstract; they present the facts and results of their research,
leading their readers along respectfully, under the assumption
that the readers are not omniscient but that they are intelligent
enough to both know that these are complicated matters and to
understand them if explained properly.
Now – you might wonder – what does this have to do with
medieval reasoning? Quite a bit, actually: the only writing
style with a worse reputation than academic-ese is the me-
dieval Scholastic style. Humanist writers carried out a veritable
defamatory campaign against Scholasticism and it was so effec-
tive that almost anyone (who doesn’t study the Middle Ages for
a living) still associates “Scholastic” with pedantic, prolix and
overly subtle hair-splitting. It’s not even a calumny, at least not
entirely: Scholastic prose looks just as specialised and occa-
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sionally convoluted as any stereotypically bad academic paper.
Not only is medieval philosophical Latin padded out with tech-
nical terms that are far too reminiscent of academic-ese jar-
gon, but it is also a ways away from the polished and ornate
Ciceronian prose (so dear to Scholastics’ Renaissance detrac-
tors) as anything can possibly be. Albeit just as artificial as its
medieval counterpart, Renaissance Latin is undeniably prettier:
the language of Scholastic philosophy is often just as bumbling
and coarse as a good chunk of academic English; moreover,
medieval Latin is a second language for everybody – so no
witty and fancy native speakers there. Nevertheless, not only
is Scholastic style’s ill repute largely undeserved, but it also
deserves to be granted a place next to the classic style as a
model of neat expository prose. Scholasticism is, first and fore-
most, a method of enquiry, focused on the analysis of texts and
philosophical issues – here “philosophical” is broadly intended
to include theological matters, scientific problems and what-
not. Scholastics’ most infamous tool is, without a doubt, the
‘quaestio’ (question), used extensively both as a teaching de-
vice and in writing. Around the second half of the 13th century
the quaestio reaches its standard structure, which goes roughly
as follows: (1) there is a whether-question (utrum) with two
opposite possible answers; (2) the first possible answer is pre-
sented along with the arguments supporting it; (3) the second
possible answer (sed contra) is presented along with the argu-
ments supporting it; (4) a solution is reached (responsio) either
by picking one of the two answers previously presented or by
outlining a third conciliatory position; (5) all the previous ar-
guments supporting the discharged answer are refuted one by
one.
How is this is supposed to be obscure? It looks like a very
sensible and linear method to me. Certainly, with its relentless
sequences of proofs and refutations, the average quaestio is not
as pretty of a read as a fine philosophical dialogue or a wittingly
written classic essay, and very few would read it for literary en-
joyment; but it is brutally efficient philosophy. The structure of
a quaestio is a powerful tool, and for some aspects it comple-
ments the classic essay nicely: while classical essayists present
their results and support them by avoiding self-reference and
meta-discourses, Scholastic writers stage their reasoning pro-
cess, showing their analysis of the issue at hand, the pros and
cons of its possible solutions, and then finally reaching a sup-
ported conclusion. This is not to say that Scholastic quaes-
tions are always easy to follow and that their arguments are
always evident and sound: as long as there has been philoso-
phy, there have been bad philosophers as well – and even the
best ones sometimes require some effort in interpretation and
reconstruction. On top of that, the technical terminology of me-
dieval philosophy is indeed not obvious to a modern reader and
not everything is always clearly spelled out, despite quaestio’s
regimented and systematic structure. However, many medieval
theories and terms – that to us are just irksome and puzzling
– would have been familiar and commonplace for the average
freshmen in the 13th or 14th century; mutatis mutandis, the
same cannot be said of our academic vernacular at its worst.
Overall, the strength of the Scholastic quaestio lies in its
structure; it is there that we can pick up a few writing tips from
our medieval colleagues: worst case scenario, we would have
made a structured and systematic argument – and our reader
would at least be aware of what our problem was and how we
attempted to solve it. Even lacking the smoothness and polish
of Renaissance prose, the quaestio gets the job done efficiently
and, in a sense, elegantly: it might not be the prettiest gown at
the party, but it’s still a step up from the white socks and san-
dals of bad academic writing. And besides, wearing an evening
dress in the afternoon would be quite out of place and outra-
geously gauche.
Graziana Ciola
Philosophy, Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa
Evidence-Based Medicine
It’s that time of year again: The 27th First Annual Ig Nobel
Prize Ceremony. Essentially, the Ig Nobel prizes aim to hon-
our ‘Achievements that first make people laugh, and then make
people think’. In other words, ‘The prizes are intended to cel-
ebrate the unusual, honor the imaginative—and spur people’s
interest in science, medicine, and technology’. The award cer-
emony takes place every September. And this year’s ceremony
can be viewed on the Improbable Research YouTube channel.
The fluid dynamics prize this year was awarded for research
completed by a then high-school student, Jiwon Han. His re-
search looked at why spillage occurs when a person is a walk-
ing along with a mug of coffee. He gives a brief talk on this
research on the TEDx Talks channel on YouTube. The main
physics prize was also on the topic of fluid dynamics. This was
awarded to Marc-Antoine Fardin for his work on whether a cat
can be both a liquid and a solid. His paper features photos of
some pretty amorphous cats.
As ever, medicine was well-represented. The main medicine
prize went to Pierre Royet, David Meunier, Nicolas Torquet,
Anne-Marie Mouly and Tao Jiang. This was for an fMRI study
measuring the extent to which certain individuals are disgusted
by cheese. There were also some other medicine-related prizes
awarded. The nutrition prize was awarded for the first report of
human blood in the diet of the hairy-legged vampire bat, which
was authored by Fernanda Ito, Enrico Bernard, and Rodrigo
A. Torres. They point out that this research has implications for
public health because of the increased risk in the transmission
of rabies. The anatomy prize went to James A. Heathcote for
his work on the important topic of why old men have big ears.
And the peace prize went to Milo Puhan, Alex Suarez, Chris-
tian Lo Cascio, Alfred Zahn, Markus Heitz, and Otto Braendli
for their randomized controlled trial looking at didgeridoo play-
ing as an alternative treatment for obstructive sleep apnoea syn-
drome. They conclude that ‘[r]egular didgeridoo playing is an
effective treatment alternative well accepted by patients with
moderate obstructive sleep apnoea syndrome’.
Until next year, some more details about the Ig Nobel Prize






PstTrth: Is Post-modernism to Blame for Our Post-truth
World? London School of Economics, London, 2 October.
LogProb: Is Logic About Probability? Pavia, Italy, 3 October.
History and Philosophy of Computing: Brno, 4–7 October.
NTiE: New Trends in Epistemology, Hamburg, 5–7 October.
AbPhilo: Williamson on Abductive Philosophy, Vienna, 7 Oc-
tober.
MaRU: Moral and Rational Uncertainty, University of Read-
ing, 9 October.
RM: Reverse Mathematics, Munich, 9–11 October.
BS: Basic Statistics (Understanding & Analysing Data), Edin-
burgh, 12–13 October.
A&E: Analysis and Explication—Traditional and Contempo-
rary Approaches, Heinrich Heine University, Duesseldorf, 20–
21 October.
RLHRC: Representation Learning for Human and Robot Cog-
nition, Bielefeld University, Germany, 17 October.
CLaR: Concept Learning and Reasoning in Conceptual Spaces,
Ruhr-University Bochum, 24–25 October.
DTT: Determinism, Time, and Totality, Umeåa University, 25–
27 October.
WiC: Where is There Causation? Umeåa University, 27–28
October.
NNiM: Nordic Network in Metaphysics Conference, Univer-
sity of Tampere, Finland, 26–27 October.
SoSR: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Workshop,
Durham University, 31 October.
November
MRiS: International Workshop Models and Representation in
Science, University of Edinburgh, 6 November.
LogWi: Logic in the Wild, Ghent University, 9–10 November.
DD: Debating Debates, New College of the Humanities, Lon-
don, 10 November.
MSaSK: Memory, Self, and Self-Knowledge, University of
York, 21 November.




Computer Simulation Methods: Summer School, High Perfor-
mance Computing Center Stuttgart (HLRS), 25–29 September.
Programmes
APhil: MA/PhD in Analytic Philosophy, University of
Barcelona.
Master Programme: MA in Pure and Applied Logic, Univer-
sity of Barcelona.
Doctoral Programme in Philosophy: Language, Mind and
Practice, Department of Philosophy, University of Zurich,
Switzerland.
Doctoral Programme in Philosophy: Department of Philoso-
phy, University of Milan, Italy.
HPSM: MA in the History and Philosophy of Science and
Medicine, Durham University.
Master Programme: in Statistics, University College Dublin.
LoPhiSC: Master in Logic, Philosophy of Science and Epis-
temology, Pantheon-Sorbonne University (Paris 1) and Paris-
Sorbonne University (Paris 4).
Master Programme: in Artificial Intelligence, Radboud Uni-
versity Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
Master Programme: Philosophy and Economics, Institute of
Philosophy, University of Bayreuth.
MA in Cognitive Science: School of Politics, International
Studies and Philosophy, Queen’s University Belfast.
MA in Logic and the Philosophy of Mathematics: Department
of Philosophy, University of Bristol.
MA Programmes: in Philosophy of Science, University of
Leeds.
MA in Logic and Philosophy of Science: Faculty of Philosophy,
Philosophy of Science and Study of Religion, LMU Munich.
MA in Logic and Theory of Science: Department of Logic of
the Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest, Hungary.
MA in Metaphysics, Language, and Mind: Department of Phi-
losophy, University of Liverpool.
MA in Mind, Brain and Learning: Westminster Institute of Ed-
ucation, Oxford Brookes University.
MA in Philosophy: by research, Tilburg University.
MA in Philosophy, Science and Society: TiLPS, Tilburg Uni-
versity.
MA in Philosophy of Biological and Cognitive Sciences: De-
partment of Philosophy, University of Bristol.
MA in Rhetoric: School of Journalism, Media and Communi-
cation, University of Central Lancashire.
MA programmes: in Philosophy of Language and Linguistics,
and Philosophy of Mind and Psychology, University of Birm-
ingham.
MRes in Methods and Practices of Philosophical Research:
Northern Institute of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen.
MSc in Applied Statistics: Department of Economics, Mathe-
matics and Statistics, Birkbeck, University of London.
MSc in Applied Statistics and Datamining: School of Mathe-
matics and Statistics, University of St Andrews.
MSc in Artificial Intelligence: Faculty of Engineering, Uni-
versity of Leeds.
MA in Reasoning
A programme at the University of Kent, Canterbury, UK. Gain
the philosophical background required for a PhD in this area.
Optional modules available from Psychology, Computing,
Statistics, Social Policy, Law, Biosciences and History.
MSc in Cognitive & Decision Sciences: Psychology, University
College London.
MSc in Cognitive Systems: Language, Learning, and Reason-
ing, University of Potsdam.
MSc in Cognitive Science: University of Osnabru¨ck, Germany.
MSc in Cognitive Psychology/Neuropsychology: School of
Psychology, University of Kent.
MSc in Logic: Institute for Logic, Language and Computation,
University of Amsterdam.
MSc in Mind, Language & Embodied Cognition: School of
Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of
Edinburgh.
MSc in Philosophy of Science, Technology and Society: Uni-
versity of Twente, The Netherlands.
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MRes in Cognitive Science and Humanities: Language, Com-
munication and Organization: Institute for Logic, Cognition,
Language, and Information, University of the Basque Country
(Donostia San Sebastia´n).
Open Mind: International School of Advanced Studies in Cog-
nitive Sciences, University of Bucharest.
Research Master in Philosophy and Economics: Erasmus Uni-
versity Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
Jobs and Studentships
Jobs
Assistant Professor: in Epistemology, California State Uni-
versity, Fullerton, Open until filled.
Post-doc: in Philosophy of Physics in Lausanne, Switzerland,
deadline 8 October.
Professorship: in Statistics, University of Bath, deadline 16
October.
Reader: in Statistics, University of Bath, deadline 16 October.
Lecturer: in Applied Mathematics, University of Bath, dead-
line 16 October.
2 Research Associates: in Artificial Intelligence For Data An-
alytics, Alan Turing Institute, London, deadline 23 October.
Assistant Professor: in Analytic Philosophy, Stanford Univer-
sity, 1 November.
Assistant Professor: in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Uni-
versity of Toronto, deadline 1 November.
Studentships
2 PhD’s: in Philosophy of Physics, Lausanne, Switzerland,
deadline 8 October.
PhD: in Statistics and Probability, University of Sussex, dead-
line 1 December.
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